Journal of Asian Security & International Affairs
In its foreign relations, every nation is constrained
by the pressure or demands that other actors—states, international
organisations, alliances and markets—exert on its politics, economics, trade or
security. In some cases, this external pressure produces evident changes in a
nation’s foreign policy; in others, it is the origin of major resistance for
change within the domestic arena, and national alliances are formed to resist
(or accommodate) those external demands. This has been the case of some middle
powers like Norway, Finland, Taiwan, South Korea or Austria that have pursued a
reactive strategy towards other great powers such as the USA, China or Russia.
Paradoxically, it is also the case of Japan. Considering the size of its
economy, its demographics and its nature as a trading union, Japan possesses
all the traits of a great power, yet it behaves like a middle power with
elements of a reactive foreign policy. Japan’s foreign (and domestic) policy
has been highly influenced by outside pressure to the extent that some
observers state that changes in Japanese politics occur as a response to the
international community rather than to domestic stimuli. As pointed out by
Mulgan, this behaviour is the result of the historical legacy of war, Japan’s
subsequent sensitivity to foreign criticism and fear of isolation for an
economy dependent on external markets. Beyond a historical approach, how can we
understand the relevance of foreign pressure in the Japanese context?
Scholarly debates have focused on the concept
of gaiatsu (or ‘foreign pressure’), a recurring term used to
describe a tendency within Japanese policymaking process to blindly react to external
pressure, particularly to that of the USA. The asymmetric economic and security
dependency of Japan to the USA justifies some decisions under the ‘Americans
made us do it’ argument, bypassing Tokyo’s agency and responsibility in a vast
array of issues from trade, economic diplomacy, foreign-aid and its
Asia-Pacific regional policy. According to this model, foreign pressure is
treated as a structural determinant, conditioning Japan’s choices on major
domestic and foreign policy matters.
In one of the first attempts to elaborate an accurate
approach to the gaiatsu model, Calder incorporated
international and domestic variables and proposed the so-called ‘reactive
state thesis’. This approach suggests that Japan does not undertake independent
initiatives in foreign policy, rather it merely reacts to pressure exerted by
foreign powers, and particularly to the US requests for change. As stressed by
Calder, ‘the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside
pressure, and reaction prevails over strategy’. Despite disagreements regarding
whether the ‘reactive state thesis’ should be applied to explain Japanese
economic foreign policy or to the field of politics and security, the model
stresses the absence of initiatives and assertiveness and points at changes in
Japanese foreign policy occurring as a response to the international community
rather than to domestic needs. As stated by Hirata for reactivists, Japan’s
foreign policy is depicted as a passive, risk-avoiding, ineffective and
flexible diplomacy. Blaker went even further by claiming that
Japan’s foreign policy is ‘minimalist’ and following a ‘coping approach has
become jarringly inappropriate to Japan’s vastly expanded, international
presence today’. Not unlike karaoke, the USA writes the lyrics of the music,
and Japan can only opt to sing a determined background music.
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